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CHAPTER 9
Final Observations
In the previous eight chapters we present our explanation for the
major trends in the U.S. labor market over the last quarter-century. In particu-
lar, we focus on explaining four critical and interrelated trends in employment
and wages. Along the way, we cover considerable territory and, therefore, it is
useful to provide a perspective by briefly restating our entire argument. We
must then try to answer several broad and important questions: Will jobless-
ness, particularly among prime-age males, continue to rise? Will other labor
market trends of the past quarter-century continue into the future? And what
measures are available to the government to ameliorate some of the adverse
effects of the trends we document?
A Summary of the Analysis
The framework for our labor market analysis is a model of four dis-
tinct labor markets defined by occupation. The tier 4 labor market consists of
the market for all the jobs in occupations with the highest levels of education
intensity. The tier 1 labor market consists of the market for all the jobs in occu-
pations with the lowest levels of education intensity. The tier 3 and tier 2 labor
markets fall in between.
Within each labor market, we assume that supply and demand determine
employment and wages, subject to a considerable degree of wage stickiness.
This wage stickiness is generated by various "efficiency wage" type situations
in which individual firms decide that the advantages of lowering wages (for
instance, lower salary costs) are outweighed by the disadvantages (for
instance, lower morale, higher turnover, more shirking).
In this type of framework, excess supply in the tier 4 labor market is not
quickly eliminated by falling wages. Instead some people with the education
and the aspiration to obtain a tier 4 job are unable to do so. As a result, they
are forced to look for a job in a lower tier occupation. As they do so, this cre-
ates excess supply in the lower tier markets which is only partly eliminated
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by wage declines. At the end of the process, some potential workers are left
jobless. In the long-run, perhaps, wages may decrease enough to absorb this
excess supply, or labor demand may increase, or labor supply may decrease.
However, in the short-run, some individuals are displaced completely from the
labor market while others are displaced into labor market tiers lower than the
one matching their educational levels and aspirations.
Table 9.1 summarizes the major strands of our empirical argument. Among
men, employment rates have fallen over the past quarter-century, especially
among those with less education. Employment rates for women have risen, but
least among those with less education. Although the number of jobs requiring
more education has risen considerably faster than the number with lower edu-
cational requirements, the number of educated workers has risen even faster.
Moreover, women have filled a disproportionate number of these jobs. These
two circumstances have initiated a chain reaction of job displacements. More
specifically, university-educated women have replaced men with a similar
education, but with lower cognitive abilities than others with the same educa-
tion. Those displaced have taken jobs previously held by workers with less
education who, in turn, have displaced those with even lower cognitive skills.
Many of the least-educated workers have been knocked completely out of the
labor force.
Although the number of jobs that can be fulfilled by those with just a high-
school education or less is increasing faster than the number of prime-age
workers with the corresponding educational credentials, real wages in these
jobs have stagnated or fallen. In other words, excess demand for workers in
the lower tier labor markets seems to result in a decrease in wages. This is due
to the fact that the pool of workers competing for such jobs has been aug-
mented by those with more than the requisite education who are displaced
from jobs commensurate with their education, the same mechanism that has
led to a rise in joblessness among the less-educated. In addition, the greater
dispersion in education levels among those working in low-level jobs has
increased wage inequality within most of these occupations.
Although the jobs that can be fulfilled only by those with a university edu-
cation have increased more slowly than the number of prime-age workers with
the requisite educational credentials, average real wages in these jobs have
risen. In other words, a situation with excess supply of workers in the highest
tier labor market seems to result in an increase in average wages. This is due
to a technology - and institution - driven segregation of the tier 4 labor mar-
ket into two sectors which we might call tiers 4-A and 4-B.
Tier 4-A consists of most professionals in the health care and legal service
industries, as well as workers with particularly high cognitive skills in some of
the other education-intensive occupations. Increased demand for health and
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Table 9.1: A Summary of the Major Arguments Made in This Book
Observable changes in the U.S. economy over the last quarter-century
1. Increased joblessness of poorly educated prime-age males (Chapter 1)
2. Downward occupational mobility, e.g., increased number of college graduates
taking "high-school" jobs (Chapter 2 )
3. Increased rate of return to a college education (Chapter 5)
4. Increased wage inequality throughout the labor market (Chapter 6 )
Exogenous causes of these changes
1. Causal factors of primary importance:
A. Increased labor force participation rate of women with at least a high-
school diploma (Chapters 1,4)
B. Skill-biased technological change: Increased demand for workers in tier 4
occupations who also have high cognitive skills (Chapter 5)
C. Increased average level of education of the population (Chapters 2, 3)
2. Causal factors of secondary importance:
A. Expansion of demand for professionals in health care and legal
occupations (Chapter 6)
B. Increased winner-take-all wage setting in tier 4 occupations (Chapter 6)
C. Lower real minimum wage (not discussed in detail)
D. Decreased union participation and bargaining power (not discussed in detail)
E. Pool of high-school dropouts has increasingly lower average abilities as
more able members obtain more education (not discussed in detail)
3. Causal factors of little importance
A. General technical change
i. Especially in low-skilled occupation (Chapters 3, 7)
ii. As a cause of turbulence in the labor market (Chapter 7)
B. Changes in the structure of production and productivity (Chapter 7)
C. Increased imports, especially from developing nations (Chapter 7)
D. Increased immigration, especially with low levels of education (Chapter 7)
E. Increased geographical mismatch between jobs (in suburbs) and workers (in cities)
(Chapter 7)
F. Subjective factors (Chapter 8)
legal services, plus the peculiar instituions of these sectors, have increased the
demand for well-educated workers in these industries. In many other indus-
tries skill-biased tehcnical change has increased the demand for workers with
high cognitive skills and a university degree faster than the supply. Average
real wages in tier 4-A have increased considerably over the last quarter-century.
Tier 4-B consists of university graduates with average or below-average
cognitive skills who are not in the health care or legal services industries.
Given the large-scale entry of women with a university degree into the work-
force, this group has seen their wages stagnate or decrease slightly. Wage
stickiness prevents these wages from decreasing dramatically, but also it
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ensures that some of these workers are unable to obtain any job in the tier 4
labor market. These workers either opt for a lower-paying job in the tier 3 or
tier 2 labor markets or they leave the labor force completely.
Average wages for all college graduates increase only because occupation-
al tier 4-A has experienced such large wage increases. Median wages for all
prime-age men with a university degree have actually decreased (see Table
5.1). This segregation of the tier 4 labor market into two sectors also helps to
explain the relatively large increase in wage inequality across workers with a
university degree.
While providing the evidence for these propositions, we also show that
other explanations for the changing employment rates do not play a major role.
More specifically, the falling employment rates of the less-educated cannot be
tied in a major way to general technological change, increased turbulence in
the labor market, the increasing importance of imports, rising numbers of
immigrants, or increasing geographical mismatch between jobs and workers.
Two last questions remain: First, are the changes in the labor market that
we have analyzed going to continue? The most pessimistic answers are offered
by those economists who have raised the possibility of a new stagnation of
employment and production in advanced capitalist societies. We need to
explore, however, whether the causal forces influencing the labor market in
the last quarter-century will remain as important. Second, if the current
employment and wage trends continue, what general policy options are open
to alleviate some of the major problems?
Is Rising Joblessness Inevitable in the U.S.A.?
The stagnation hypothesis - that advanced capitalist economies must
inevitably experience long-term unemployment - is making a comeback in
recent years.1 This time around, however, the justification of the stagnation
hypothesis lies not just in a deficiency of aggregate demand or automation that
displaces workers but in structural changes in the economy. For reasons out-
lined below, we remain unpersuaded by these claims. Nevertheless, it is
important to look briefly at these arguments.
Economists have advanced many different reasons why unemployment or
joblessness might occur. Stagnationists argue that some of these reasons are
becoming more important over time. The traditional stagnation argument gen-
erally starts from demand side considerations: As our wants allegedly become
satisfied with rising per capita income, aggregate demand will not rise as fast
as our production potential, and the unemployment rate rises. Given the fact
1 An extreme form of the argument is by Rifkin (1995).
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that consumption is rising faster than income, this argument appears to have
been abandoned. Thus, stagnationists have focused attention instead on certain
supply side factors and policy considerations, particularly those related to the
impact of increasing world economic integration ("globalization") and the
effects of automation.
According to John Eatwell (1996-b), for instance, the post-Bretton Woods
trading and payments system has been unable "to deal with international trad-
ing imbalances other than by deflation and growing unemployment in weaker
countries - a deflationary impulse that has proved contagious." This is exac-
erbated by the deregulation of global markets and the huge increase in short-
term capital flows, driven especially by currency speculation. The
economic consequences include wild currency rate fluctuations and much
greater exchange rate risks to domestic producers and traders. Among other
things such risks discourage investment, which in turn limits the growth of
employment.
To reduce these risks, government policy-makers must place greater
emphasis on the maintenance of market credibility, especially those associat-
ed with deflationary policies. In short, central banks have increasingly elevat-
ed financial stability over employment as policy priorities.
Alice Amsden (1996) raises other considerations associated with globaliza-
tion. With the fall of barriers to international trade, the ratio of imports to total
domestic production has been rising in most nations. As a result, governments
are less capable of using fiscal policy to reduce unemployment because a larg-
er share of any domestic fiscal stimulus leaks into the international economy,
rather than raising employment at home. This is exacerbated by the conver-
gence of technological capabilities throughout the world, signifying the loss of
U.S. technological hegemony. Among other things this updating of Raymond
Vernon's argument about the product cycle means that competing products are
being produced in many different countries, so substitution of domestic by for-
eign products is easier.
She also argues that the increased global competition gives greater incen-
tives for labor-saving process innovations. When the U.S. had technological
dominance in the world, such increased productivity led to greater exports and
domestic employment. In recent years, however, such downsizing measures
are increasingly necessary merely to meet foreign competition and maintain
sales in domestic markets, resulting in no additional employment.
Finally, the global technological convergence, abetted by multinational
firms, means that the product cycle is shortened and production innovations in
one country are rapidly copied in other countries. Such increased competition
lowers the rate of return to innovation, which leads to less investment and
lower employment increases.
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Chart 9.1: Joblessness among prime-age men and women
Although we do not wish to enter these arguments in detail, three
general comments are in order. First, the endpoint of globalization is not in
sight and U.S. integration into the world economy, at least as measured by the
rising rate of imports to the GDP, shows no sign of abatement. Second,
it seems indisputable that increasing globalization is placing increasing con-
straints on the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy. This is occurring for
the same reason that fiscal and monetary policy by state and local
governments is seldom an effective way to reduce unemployment.2 Finally,
some risks associated with increasing integration into the world economy, for
instance, exchange rate fluctuations, can be insured against through the futures
market and other institutions.
The key argument against the stagnationists is empirical. The data in Chart
9.1 show a declining rate of joblessness over the 31-year period from 1964
through 1995. Although the percentage of the unemployed prime-age workers
has risen, the percentage of those who are totally out of the workforce has
plummeted. This fall is primarily due to the entry of women into the labor
2 For fiscal policy we are speaking of employment effects other than on the first round. Clearly
a government can put unemployed workers to work by borrowing and paying them to do some-
thing, but the second round effects for a highly open economy such as a city or a region are
seldom very significant.
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force, which has more than offset the withdrawal of prime-age men. That is,
overall labor market absorption has been high, even though the employment
situation for particular subgroups such as less- educated prime-age males has
deteriorated markedly. We might add that our investigations in Chapter 7 also
show that not much of the change in the U.S. employment rate can be
explained by the nation's increasing involvement in international trade.
To digress briefly from the path of our narrative, we looked fleetingly at the
problem of how to measure the "tightness" of the labor market to explore cer-
tain facets of the stagnationist arguments. Throughout this book, we have been
examining the rate of joblessness, and yet in most discussions the unemploy-
ment rate is generally considered the preferred measure of labor market prob-
lems. The issue is particularly acute for those trying to estimate the relation
between tightness of the labor market and inflation (the Phillips curve). A typ-
ical equation relates price increases (for instance, of the GDP deflator) to some
measure of price expectations (such as last year's increase in the GDP defla-
tor), some measure of price increases coming from the outside world (such as
the increase in crude material prices), and some measure of labor market tight-
ness such as the unemployment rate for the economy as a whole.
This standard approach does not, however, explain the simultaneous
decrease in unemployment and inflation that occurred in the mid 1990s. If we
instead use the jobless rate among prime-age males as a measure of labor mar-
ket tightness, the calculation yields a much better statistical fit. This is because
the jobless rate decreased only slightly during the 1990s, so that according to
this measure the labor market tightness did not markedly increase.3
Will Employment and Wage Trends of the Last
Quarter-Century Continue in the Future?
This brief exploration of the stagnation hypothesis leads us to a more
important question, namely whether the trends we have chronicled in the last
25 years are bound to continue. We approach this issue by asking a more
tractable question: Does the period from 1970 through 1995 exhibit suffi-
ciently unique features that they cannot be expected to recur in the future?
Table 9.1 suggests that the three primary sources of these trends are the
3 More specifically, for the period 1987 through 1997 the coefficient of determination when
using the unemployment rate measure is .7854 and is .8931 when using the jobless rate for
prime- age males. For the period 1980 through 1997, the jobless rate still provides a
superior fit, although the difference is much less. The coefficients of determination are respec-
tively .9496 and .9599. The data for this calculation come from the national income and
product accounts, the producer price index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and our calculations
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increased labor force participation of women, a particular type of technologi-
cal change, and the increased average level of education. We will briefly
examine each of these.
Increased Labor Force Participation of Women
The increased labor force participation of women over the last quar-
ter-century has led to a labor absorption problem: the large increases in labor
demand have not kept up with the even larger increases in labor supply. Will
this continue? To answer this it is useful to examine certain key indicators for
the entire period from 1950 to the present to show that the problem of labor
absorption during this period was particularly acute.
From the data presented in Table 9.2, we can draw two quick conclusions.
First, the decade of the 1970s featured the fastest growth in population of
potential workers. This is, of course, the result of the baby-boom generation
reaching the legal minimum age for employment, and indicates a serious prob-
lem of labor force absorption. The prime working-age population reached its
peak growth in the decade of the 1980s. Second, the faster growth of the
employed labor force indicates a rising labor force participation ratio. This, of
course, is the result of the rapid influx of women into the labor force, and it
exacerbates the labor-force-absorption problem.
In certain respects these conditions are not likely to be repeated in the fore-
seeable future. In the quarter-century from 1995 to 2020, the U.S. Census
Bureau (1996) projects that the population (middle series) from 16 through 64
will grow at average annual rates of 0.7 percent, an estimate that includes the
"baby-boom echo." This, of course, is significantly lower than the average
annual rate of 1.4 percent that this population grew between 1970 and 1995,
fueled primarily by the post-World War II baby boom.
Furthermore, the rapid increase in the employment rate of women is unlike-
ly to be repeated. As shown in Table 9-2, the growth of average employment
rates of women in the prime working-ages began to decelerate in 1980-84,
when it rose 7.3 percentage points over the previous five years. By the first
half of the 1990s, the prime-age female employment rate increased only 2.4
percentage points over the previous five years.
Several counteracting factors can be mentioned. Women have increasingly
more education which is associated with higher levels of labor force partici-
pation. Moreover, as long as the average wages of women are less than those
of men, employers have an economic incentive to substitute female for male
employees. These, however, do not seem strong enough to offset public opin-
of the jobless rate (only for the month of March) from the Current Population Survey.
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Table 9.2: Indicators of the Growth of Population, Labor, Capital,
and Investment
Indicator
Civilian non-institutional population, 16-64
Employed civilian labor force
Gross reproducible tangible wealth
Net reproducible tangible wealth
Ratio: total gross investment to GDP
Ratio: total net investment to GDP
Share of total investment in government sector
Share of total investment by foreigners
Federal government deficit as a share of total
investment
Average annual
1950-
1960
0.8%
1.1
3.3
3.8
Annual
1950-
1959
23.0%
14.2
28.9
-0.6
-0.8
1960-
1970
1.5%
1.9
3.6
4.0
growth rates
1970-
1980
2.0%
2.1
3.4
3.2
averages
1960-
1969
20.4%
12.4
25.6
-3.0
-1.9
1970-
1979
20.7%
11.0
17.6
-1.3
9.6
1980-
1990
1.1%
2.0
2.9
2.6
1980-
1989
20.5%
9.1
17.3
8.3
16.2
1990-
1995
0.9%
1.0
2.6
2.1
1990
1995
17.3%
7.0
18.9
6.8
18.8
1970- 1975- 1980 1985 1990-
1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Employment rates: Prime-age males
Employment rates: Prime-age females
92.5%
48.7
90.0%
55.5
87.6%
62.8
88.7% 87.2%
68.8 71.1
Notes: The gross capital stock and investment data include investment in both the private and
public sectors.
Sources: The population and labor force data come from Council of Economic Advisors (annu-
al, 1997), Tables B-32 to B-34. The wealth data come from: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis (monthly, 8/1994), p. 62, supplemented by data for 1994 supplied
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and our own estimates for 1995. The national accounts data
come from Council of Economic Advisors (annual, 1997), Tables B-l, B-24, B-30, and B-34, sup-
plemented by U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992, 1993), Tables
1-1, 3-2, and 5-1 plus our own estimate of depreciation of the government capital stock from 1950
through 1959. The data on employment of prime working-age workers come from the CPS.
ion results presented by Wattenberg (1991) indicating that the percentage of all
women wanting to stay home has stopped falling. We believe it is likely that
the percentage of women in the labor force will grow very slowly, or even
level off in the next few years.
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Skill-Biased Technical Change
It is much more difficult to predict trends in technological change.
We have identified that the two most important implications of recent techno-
logical change are a large increased demand for individual workers in high-
education occupations who also have high cognitive skills, plus a smaller
increased demand for occupations in higher-education tiers. What type of
technological change is behind this? We have no specialized data or knowl-
edge in this area, but we do believe that much of the technological change that
has affected labor demand can be attributed to the computer/electronic/com-
munications/information systems revolution which began about a quarter-
century ago.
Are the major changes caused by this revolution finished? Certainly there
are incremental technological improvements occurring in these areas con-
stantly. There also continue to be major changes every few years. The conver-
sion of the command-line driven Internet into the World Wide Web (WWW),
filled with millions of graphically intense "home pages" is perhaps the most
recent example. In just three or four years, the WWW has dramatically
changed the way that many economic transactions are handled, both within
and between firms. Although it is hard to envision what the next big change
will be, we are unlikely to see an end to such changes in the near future.
One constraining factor on technological growth deserves mention. In so
far as new technology is embodied in new capital investment, it is necessary
to consider capital accumulation. Table 9.2 shows that over the last
quarter-century, capital was rising at a faster rate than labor, so that the
capital/labor ratio was increasing. Nevertheless, the rate of increase of this
ratio was much slower than in the first two decades of the post-World War II
era. In recent years, the growth of the capital stock has declined as the
ratio of investment to GDP has fallen. Although part of this was due to a fall
in the share of investment carried out by various levels of government, the
table shows that a major share was due to a fall in domestic savings. Indeed,
the growth of the capital stock would have been even slower if foreigners
had not increased their assets in the United States. If the savings rate contin-
ues to fall, the importance of the skill-biased technical change may
lessen, other factors remaining the same.
Rising Average Education
Finally, what can be said about trends in average levels of education?
In Chart 2.1 in Chapter 2 we present some relevant evidence. The fraction of
the population completing at least some schooling beyond the high-school
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diploma has increased over the entire quarter-century. However, the rate of
increase has slowed in recent years.
As the costs of most types of post-secondary education (including public)
continue to grow much faster than average earnings, this deceleration may
continue. On the other hand, our analysis throughout this book strongly sup-
ports the notion that obtaining a college degree will increase a person's expect-
ed lifetime income considerably more now than 25 years ago. This increases
the incentive to acquire more education. It is likely, though, that the budget
constraint issue will dominate for most of the population, at least barring mas-
sive new governmental subsidies to post-secondary education. This, in turn,
will lead to a continued slowdown in the increase in average education, and
perhaps a leveling-off of average years of education in the near future.
Summary
So how do we pull these predictions together? The shards of evidence
presented above suggest that the displacement of men by women will be less
strong in the future as the percentage of women in the labor force levels off.
As a result, the impact of their disproportionate employment in jobs requiring
more education will not be as great in the coming years as in the period from
1970 through 1995. Also, as the increase in the average level of education
slows down, the downward occupational mobility generated by this will also
level off. These considerations lead us to give even less credence to the pes-
simistic employment predictions of the stagnationists, even while we remain
gloomy about trends in the distribution of wages.
The one highly unpredictable element is technological change. If it contin-
ues in its current direction, the demand for workers with both high education
and high cognitive skills will continue to grow, as will wage inequality. If tech-
nological change, which is difficult to predict, diverges from its current trend,
anything is possible.
Some General Policy Implications
This is not a book on labor market policies. Nevertheless, our argu-
ments have some important implications, mostly negative, about the likely
success of a wide range of public policies aimed at reducing the joblessness of
less-educated prime-age workers and/or decreasing wage inequality. In this
section we briefly describe the likely impact on joblessness, the wage level,
and wage inequality of a number of widely discussed policies. For the sake of
expositional clarity, we divide these polices into groups according to their
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focus on workers in low-wage or high-wage jobs (or all jobs) and to their
direct impact on the supply or the demand side of the labor market, or on insti-
tutions involving both supply and demand.
Policies Targeted at Low-Wage Workers and the Jobless
It is useful to distinguish policies focusing on the supply and demand
sides of the labor market with those dealing with overall market functioning.
Supply-side policies: Policies concerned with low-wage jobs and the supply
side of the labor market usually focus on increasing human capital or establish-
ing greater incentives for people to choose to work. The human capital policies,
in turn, can target persons either before or after they first enter the workforce.
Several programs under discussion focus on improving the human capital
of U.S. workers before they enter the workforce, either by increasing their
years of formal schooling or by improving the content of their education. For
instance, at the primary and secondary levels of education these include pro-
posals to restructure the educational system by using vouchers, or the
Murnane-Levy (1997) proposals to increase the effectiveness of education by
teaching the "new basic skills." In 1997, at the university level, these proposed
policies include plans by both the President and the Congress to give certain
tax incentives for university study. The biggest weakness of such programs is
the difficulty in improving the quality of education, especially in low-income
urban neighborhoods, without improving many other characteristics of life there.
The alternative approach is to target human capital programs at jobless
workers who are no longer in school. Unfortunately, the benefit/cost ratios of
many such programs designed to improve the education and/or skills of less-
educated workers have been low. Indeed, some economists have argued that
such a focus on low-skilled workers is not the most effective way of spending
scarce educational resources (Heckman, Roselius, and Smith, 1994). Although
the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) led to modest wage gains for adult
women that were higher than the costs of the program, for adult men and for
youth, the program did not seem to have any significant impact on the income
of the participants (Orr et al, 1995). Economists have also studied the bene-
fits and costs of other job training programs, but their economic payoffs seem
modest at best.4
This category of labor supply policies also includes proposals to cut back
on unemployment insurance benefits, welfare payments, or Medicaid to
increase incentives to work (actually, to decrease disincentives to work). These
4 Recent studies of the benefit/costs of job training programs include those of: Friedlander and
Burtless (1994); Grubb (1996), Heckman, Lochner, Smith and Taber (1997), and Kodrzycki
(1997).
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are, of course, harsher policies than those enhancing human capital.
Discussion of such approaches usually hinge on the question about whether
joblessness is voluntary or involuntary.
Policies aimed at changing work incentives also include raising the real
value of the minimum wage. This is just a positive incentive version of reduc-
ing unemployment insurance benefits, welfare payments, or Medicaid. As
such, it also creates an incentive for low-wage workers to choose to work,
while also potentially increasing their economic well-being. Of course, the
welfare increase only occurs if they can acquire a job at the new higher mini-
mum wage. Unfortunately, an increased minimum wage may cause a reduc-
tion in the quantity of labor demanded.
From our viewpoint in this book, the major problem with all of these labor
supply policies is that they may not lead to any net increase in employment.
Instead, such policies may just lead to new types of displacement as those who
are lucky enough to benefit from a human capital enhancing program or
unlucky enough to be cut off from a welfare-type program, will be in a better
position, and try harder, to take a job away from another relatively low-wage
worker. If this happens, net employment will be unchanged. The wage rate
paid may increase because the new worker is more productive than the old
worker, or decrease, because the number of persons competing for the job is
greater. Thus, wage inequality can either narrow or widen.
This problem of displacement is a serious one. The employment equations
(Table 2.4) suggest that those obtaining additional education will increase their
probability of employment. For instance, a GED does increase employment
rates. We need to take into account, however, the fallacy of composition: what
is true for a single individual may not necessary be true for an entire group
which, in this case, is the entire cohort of those with the same education.
For instance, if education among the less-educated is upgraded, without
changing the number of jobs available, only the educational mix of the
unemployed will change. In addition, those who still have not obtained high-
er educational credentials may end up with highter rates of joblessness.
We do not mean to imply that such education policies should be abandoned,
because such policies achieve other social goals. In particular, decreasing the
number of less-educated workers and increasing the number of more-educat-
ed workers can have one useful long-run outcome. It would result in a reduc-
tion in the relative price (or wage) of more-educated workers and therefore
encourage producers to adopt more advanced methods to take advantage of the
lower cost of such skilled workers. This, in turn, would help in the long-run to
maintain the nation's position as a technological leader. But such policies
would not, in and of themselves, create new jobs in the short-term.
Demand-side policies: Policies targeting less-educated, low-wage workers
and the jobless from the demand side include wage or employment subsidies
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that reduce the hourly costs to employers of hiring less-educated workers.
These might lead to an increase in the employment of the least-educated, and,
although a small amount of displacement might occur, it would certainly be
less than with policies enhancing human capital. This would not necessarily
lead to a change in wage inequality, but it would lead to a decrease in income
inequality as more of the less-educated are employed.
On the negative side, such subsidized workers could be stigmatized,
increasing the reluctance of employers to hire them. Results of experiments of
certain wage-subsidy programs have been mixed, although not all parameters
of such policies have been thoroughly explored. Recently, Edmund Phelps
(1997) has made a strong case for employment subsidies, arguing that besides
the obvious direct benefits to recipients, the indirect positive benefits greatly
outweigh the indirect negative impacts.
Market-functioning policies: Market functioning policies facilitate the
matching of less-educated workers to jobs by either direct or indirect methods.
The former include programs that are specifically aimed at helping individual
low-income persons find employment. In this regard it is important to note
that programs to help workers find jobs have had a higher payoff to the indi-
viduals involved than the job training programs. Unfortunately, Uchitell
(1997) shows that helping welfare recipients obtain jobs often means that the
working poor who hold these jobs find themselves unemployed. Thus,
federal mandates for job creation for one group of the less-educated
workers can take away employment from another group - the displacement
problem again.
A similar conclusion would apply to any attempts to reduce the amount of
"credentialism" in the hiring process. For instance, some have argued that
weakening anti-discrimination laws would make employers more willing to
test workers for both hard and soft skills without having to worry as much
about lawsuits claiming that the tests have little to do with the direct require-
ments of particular jobs. Such a measure might alter the mix of workers that a
typical firm hires. Those with the least education would certainly have a bet-
ter chance of being offered a job if "credentials" were not the primary hiring
determinant. Nevertheless, such a change would not necessarily lead to an
increase in the total number of jobs available.
Additional indirect programs matching less-educated workers to positions
requiring few skills include those requiring employers to list all job openings
at a central employment registry. By consolidating the dissemination of infor-
mation about job openings, both information costs to job seekers and unfilled
job-openings would be reduced.5 Improved public transportation would also
help central city dwellers reach jobs in the suburbs.
5 Of course, it is possible that greater employment of the less-educated could come at the
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Policies Targeted at Medium- or High-Wage Workers
The policies discussed so far are all aimed at the jobless and those in
low-wage jobs. Yet our analysis suggests that the cause of their employment
problems lie in a different part of the labor market. Are there any policies
which deal more directly with the source of the problem? We again divide
these policies according to the same criteria as used above.
Supply-side policies: One intriguing supply-side policy has received con-
siderable discussion in Europe, namely work sharing and/or work spreading.
For instance, in some of the middle and high-wage occupations, each worker
could work fewer hours per week (at approximately the same hourly wage
rate) and more total workers could be hired. Within our model, this would lead
to less downward occupational mobility and would alleviate some of the
excess labor supply in the low-wage jobs. This would decrease joblessness
among the less-educated and also raise wages. It would probably result in a
decrease in wage inequality as the lowest wages move a little closer to the
middle of the overall wage distribution.
Such policies would, of course, have an impact on average weekly working
hours which slowly declined in the U.S. until 1990, when they began to level
off (Bureau of the Census, annual, 1995, Table 666). Certainly, measures could
be taken to encourage enterprises to begin cutting back further on the hours
worked by existing workers, and to begin hiring new workers as substitutes.
These policies have two major difficulties. Unfortunately, many kinds of
work require high fixed costs for new workers - recruiting, training, benefits,
and logistics - so that this solution is often costly. Moreover, policies leading
to the reduction of work hours means lower weekly earnings and many fami-
lies may not willingly accept such a situation.
An alternative supply-side approach would be to increase the cognitive
skills of many of the low- and middle-level college graduates. They could then
take advantage of the excess demand for these skills, receive a high wage,
reduce downward occupational mobility, and alleviate some of the excess
labor supply in the low-wage occupations. Unfortunately, there are no widely-
accepted ideas as to how to accomplish this proposal.
Demand-side polices: Demand-side policies targeting medium- and high-
wage jobs have received little discussion and it is difficult to think of any that
would be politically feasible. Given this consideration, it is ironic that our
analysis suggests that the most direct way to remedy the increased joblessness
expense of more-educated workers, who are now holding these jobs and who could be more read-
ily replaced. In this case, such a program might also lead to a reduction in wages in these low-skill
jobs because of the increased competition. Of course, replacement might not occur if employers
preferred to hire workers with more educational credentials than those necessary for the job.
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and lower wages among less-educated persons is to increase the demand for
college graduates with average or below-average cognitive skills. The most
obvious way to do this is through wage or employment subsidies to firms that
hire such college graduates. This would keep average and below-average col-
lege graduates from competing for jobs in tier 3 and tier 2 occupations and
thus prevent the displacement mechanism from occurring. Of course this
would require a method for distinguishing which types of jobs and/or college
graduates would be eligible for the subsidy - a very difficult task. However,
the biggest obstacle to this type of program would be the perception that the peo-
ple with the most education - and therefore the best chance of economic success -
are receiving a subsidy which less-educated persons are not.
A slightly more realistic demand-side policy - which would help reduce
wage inequality but not joblessness - would be salary caps. In the U.S., the
only well-known examples of such salary caps are for various types of gov-
ernment workers but, of course, they could also be imposed on private sector
firms in the same way as the minimum wage mandate. Much recent public dis-
cussion has focused on the possibility of imposing salary caps on CEOs - per-
haps defined as some fixed multiple of the average non-executive wage with-
in their company. There have been some grass-root attempts by workers and
shareholders to get CEOs to accept a "voluntary" salary cap as evidence of
commitment to everyone involved with the firm. It should not be surprising,
however, that no prominent CEOs have accepted such an agreement.
Market-functioning policies: Market functioning policies focusing on the
labor market for medium- and high-wage jobs in order to decrease joblessness
or reduce wage inequality have received little public attention. While it is doubt-
ful that any feasible policy could reduce joblessness at this level, wage inequal-
ity can be accomplished with progressive income, earnings, or consumption
taxes. In the U.S. we currently have a progressive income tax, although it is less
progressive today than at any time since the 1950s. This is the most direct type of
policy to reduce wage inequality, but it does nothing to improve the problems of
joblessness and low-wages among less-educated workers.
Policies Targeted at the Entire Labor Force
A more direct solution to the problems of joblessness and wage
inequality lies with economy-wide programs to accelerate the job creation
process, regardless of educational credentials required in these new job open-
ings. Since the absorption problem of less-educated workers will be less acute
in the coming quarter-century than in the last 25 years, problems of job cre-
ation by public policy are more tractable than in the recent past. We must note,
of course, that job creation in the U.S. over the period under examination has
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been higher than almost any industrialized country in the world, an achieve-
ment driven partly by a faster growth of the labor force. But U.S. labor force
participation rates have also been among the highest in the OECD.6
Nevertheless, the rising jobless rates among less-educated males in the U.S.
suggests that even more should be done.
Such job creation policies are easier to prescribe on a general level than to
design the particulars. In the short-run, such policies could involve some com-
bination of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. In the long-run, such
policies could focus on increasing savings and investment so that the capital
stock grows. The latter would typically lead to some increase in the demand
for labor (capital widening). In some cases an increasing capital stock could
just increase the productivity of existing workers (capital deepening) and lead
to higher wages but no increase in employment.
A major difficulty with such policies is that the short-run requirements
often conflict with the long-run requirements, and the long-run requirements
are difficult to implement. If strongly expansionary fiscal policies are com-
bined with moderately restrictive monetary polices, as was done through much
of the 1980s, this leads to short-term job creation plus high interest rates.
However, the high interest rates discourage investment which is necessary for
the long-run goal of increasing the capital stock. Thus, an alternative short-run
strategy might involve strongly expansionary monetary policy with mildly
contractionary fiscal policy. With this combination, the private savings for-
merly used to finance the government deficit would be diverted to the private
sector. Interest rates would fall initially, which would encourage more invest-
ment. The obvious problem is that such policies, unless carefully adminis-
tered, might unleash inflationary forces which, in turn, would eventually result
in increased interest rates and reduced investment.
What if we ignore short-run job creation and focus strictly on long-run
results? Unfortunately, we are not sure how to increase savings and investment
in the long-run. Considerable debate currently centers around the issue of
whether the savings incentives offered by the U.S. government (such as IRAs
or 401(k) plans) have actually led to an increase in savings. We believe that
they probably haven't been very effective, as evidenced by the general decline
in the personal savings rate in the last several decades. The appropriate data
on the issue, however, are fiendishly difficult to interpret.7
6 OECD (1996), p 196. Of the 24 nations with labor force participation data from 1973 through
1995, the increase in the U.S. was fourth highest. Only Iceland, Netherlands, and New Zealand
were higher.
7 A useful summary of the current state of the debate is found in the exchange between Hubbard
and Skinner (1996), Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996), and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996).
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Although additional saving might result in lower interest rates, a related
question is whether this would lead, in turn, to more domestic investment,
instead of flowing abroad. Some such as Bayoumi (1990) argue that although
governmental policy may influence savings and investment at a single point in
time, savings and investment are correlated over time primarily because of dis-
turbances to the economy as a whole. This means that attempts to increase
domestic investment financed by domestic savings have little long-term impact
Of course, it is also possible that direct job creation policies, for instance,
investment incentive programs such as reduction of the capital gains tax on
new investment or, for that matter, tax incentives tied directly to job creation,
might be more effective than saving incentives. But enormous controversy
exists over the cost effectiveness of such measures that have been tried in the
past. Still on the micro-level, a restructuring of capital markets to increase the
quality of information available to potential lenders might reduce their lend-
ing risks and increase aggregate investment. Unfortunately, specification of
the most effective investment incentive program to encourage job creation
would take us light years away from the major theme of this book and, there-
fore, must be left for others.
One simple policy truth must be stressed. Simply increasing the demand for
workers by the creation of new jobs would not be enough. Such policies would
also have to be combined with other programs to match workers with jobs. In
addition, effective methods of determining the actual skills of individual work-
ers so that employers would not need to rely on formal educational credentials
alone, would have to be combined with changes in labor market institutions so
that better information about available jobs is available.
Final Words
Our analysis also has one last important policy message. Until the
problems of obtaining more employment for less-educated men and reducing
wage inequality are viewed in terms of the entire labor market, the key param-
eters for policy success remain hidden. Of course, the unprecedented boom in
the last decade of the century did lead to a fall in unemployment and narrow-
ing of wage differentials in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, by the beginning of
the new millennium the jobless rate was still at a very high level and the level
of wage inequality was much higher than a quarter of a century before.
Although macro-economic success can reduce the magnitude of these prob-
lems, the basic labor market difficulties still remain.
These problems must be viewed broadly in order to judge the real impact
of programs designed to help a particular segment of the labor force. It is our
hope that this study provides such a perspective to the joblessness and low-
wage problems that have had a devastating effect on so many lives.
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